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In this paper we are interested in the relationship between globalization, political institutions 
(notably,  democracy)  and  international  environmental  commitments.  This  relationship  has 
been the subject of a particularly intensive debate and the existing literature offers a wide 
range of partly competing claims with respect to the driving forces of international environ-
mental cooperation. While some authors argue that democracy and globalization tend to pro-
mote international efforts to mitigate or resolve environmental problems others have chal-
lenged these propositions theoretically and empirically. We argue that existing studies suffer 
from three weaknesses. First, they are based on very small samples of multilateral environ-
mental treaties in respect to which commitment is coded (usually in terms of treaty ratifica-
tion) and are cross-sectional. Second, they examine the effects of globalization and political 
institutions on international environmental policy separately and ignore potential joint effects. 
Third, they ignore interdependency (diffusion) effects - i.e., they do not account for the possi-
bility that international commitment of one country is likely to depend on what other coun-
tries and specific types or groups of other countries do (network effects). Based on a new 
panel dataset that includes the commitments of 180 countries with regard to international en-
vironmental treaties from 1902 to 2005 we study whether and how international economic 
and political integration, and domestic political institutions jointly affect international envi-
ronmental commitments. We also study interdependency (network) effects on our dependent 
variable. Our preliminary results show that the net effect of democracy on environmental co-
operation is rather diffuse and so is the effect of economic integration (trade openness).  
 
 




   2 
1.  Introduction 
The relationships between globalization and the environment and to a lesser degree between 
democracy and the environment remain unresolved issues.  
Many environmental problems such as the destruction of the ozone layer or the depletion of 
fish stock although are caused by individual, national economic behaviour, they are not lim-
ited to national boundaries but they rather affect the global society as a whole.  
Public goods and the tragedy of the commons (Olson and Hardin). 
International cooperation to overcome the problem of the free rider. 
Define outputs and outcomes. 
 
In contrast to the voluminous literature on the impact of globalization and political system on 
environmental outcomes, the literature on their effects on the signing and ratification of inter-
national environmental treaties is scarce. This research has been built mainly on game theo-
retical models such as the Prisoners Dilemma and the game of chicken, and is largely limited 
to case studies and based on anecdotal evidence. We are not aware of any studies that try to 
quantitatively explain states’ willingness to ratify international environmental treaties on the 
global scale and over time. 
 
 
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: the subsequent section gives an over-
view of existing literature, followed by the delineation of our theoretical framework and deri-
vation of empirically testable hypotheses in section 2. Section 3 is dedicated to the research 
design and discussion of some methodological questions. The empirical part is completed by 




2. Theoretical arguments and hypotheses  
Our theoretical argument relies on the liberal approach to international institutions, stipulating 
that a country’s decision to ratify a treaty depends on a government’s cost-benefit calculation. 
The explanatory factors outlined below are thus addressed in terms of their influence on gov-
ernments’ incentives to ratify a certain treaty. We postulate that globalization (trade and IGO 
membership), democracy and diffusion processes affect the willingness of a government to 
ratify an international environmental treaty. 
 
Globalization   3 
Although in the literature globalization usually refers to economic interdependence and in 
particular to trade relations, we perceive globalization as involving both economic and politi-
cal elements.  
Economic integration: Trade 
Trade affects the domestic economy and therefore also environmental behaviour. Although 
the impact of trade on the environment is theoretically ambiguous because of offsetting forces 
(the pollution haven hypothesis, the effects of trade on the scale of production and the positive 
effects of trade on income), Antweiler et al. (2001), Frankel and Rose (2002) establish that, at 
least for SO2 emissions and less so for Particulate Matter and NO2, the net effect of trade is to 
reduce pollution levels. Neumayer (2002a) relying mainly on arguments based on idealistic 
and self-interest grounds such as the “liberal peace” as well as reputation, coercion and sig-
nalling, argues that trade openness promotes multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). 
However, his empirical findings provide only weak statistical evidence and he concludes that 
“...countries’ willingness to cooperate in MEAs depends on whether the MEA under consid-
eration is likely to threaten or accommodate the interests of exporters” (Neumayer, 2002a: 
831). We strongly believe that Neumayer’s empirical findings are more in line with a com-
parative advantage argument. An argument that although he makes in his article, he dismisses 
in favour of more idealistic ones. 
According to standard trade theory (H-O), trade leads to more production of the good 
that is intensive in the factor that is abundant in the country. Consequently, if the comparative 
advantage derives from the distribution of the world endowments of the factors of production 
(the factor endowments theory), then the developed countries, which become dirtier with free 
trade due to their capital abundance, will not be willing to ratify an environmental agreement 
that hampers their comparative advantage in the production of the dirty good. If, on the other 
hand, the comparative advantage derives from policy related differences in tolerance of pollu-
tion (the pollution haven hypothesis), then the less developed countries, which are expected to   4 
become dirtier with international trade due to pollution haven effects, will refrain from ratify-
ing an environmental agreement that hurts their comparative advantage which derives from 
laxer environmental regulation. Consequently, given that participation in international envi-
ronmental treaties often implies incurring economic costs to achieve the postulated environ-
mental objectives, self-interested states concerned about losses to their economic competi-
tiveness will refrain from ratifying such treaties. The unwillingness of the USA to ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol is a prime example of this case. We expect the relationship between trade 
openness and ratification of an international environmental treaty to be a negative one. 
   
 
H1(a): The more open to international trade a country is, the lower the probability that 
this country ratifies an environmental treaty. 
 
 
Political integration: Membership in IOs  
Rational choice institutionalism poses that under conditions of interdependence, uncertainty, 
and high transaction costs, states form international organizations (IOs) in order to facilitate 
cooperation. That is, IOs by increasing information and decreasing transaction costs and un-
certainty facilitate the implementation of international regulations and reduce the risk of op-
portunism (free-riding behavior) (Haas, Keohane and Levy, 1993; Mitchell, 1994). IOs by 
steering states to move  away  from pursuing relative  gains  and towards positive-sum out-
comes, help them to overcome collective action problems and promote their shared interests 
(Young 1994). In addition, IOs can resolve many complex technical problems that individual 
competing states could not deal with effectively (Mittrany, 1966; Haas, 1964).
1 Consequently, 
membership in IOs signals a government’s willingness to cooperate and to introduce rules and 
regulations that benefit not only the participants but often also non-participants. Given that 
solving international environmental problems is a matter of cooperation among states, it is 
                                                 
1 Abbott and Snidal (2000) and Simmons (2000) similarly see international treaties as func-
tional solutions to efficiency problems.   5 
reasonable to assume that IO membership affect positively the willingness of a state to parti-
cipate in a MEA. Although rational states choose to participate in a MEA only when they 
estimate that the benefits accrued to them by implementing the particular treaty are higher 
than unilateral efforts, failure to ratify the treaty could lead to reciprocal actions by other sta-
tes that would undermine the collective effort. As Axelrod (1984) had argued reciprocity en-
courages the emergence of cooperation.  Moreover, signing an environmental treaty and then 
failing to ratify it entails “audience costs” in terms of credibility loss (reputation) that may 
have future repercussions on the foreign policies of the defecting state (Simmons, 2000). We 
expect membership in IOs increase the probability that a state will ratify an international envi-
ronmental treaty.  
 
H1(b): The higher the number of IGOs a country is participating in, the higher the 
probability that this country ratifies an environmental treaty. 
 
Democracy 
Fearon (1994), Gaubatz (1996), Leeds (1999), Martin (2000), Mansfied et al (2002) argue that 
democratic states are more likely to make credible international policy commitments than 
their autocratic counterparts because their strong but inflexible institutions, the accountability 
of the leaders to the electoral, domestic audience costs, transparency, etc.  We argue that po-
litical systems can influence international environmental commitments through either their 
institutional characteristics (median voter versus elites) and/or civil liberties, audience cost 
and transparency. 
Institutional characteristics  
The impact of democratic institutional characteristics on the ratification of international envi-
ronmental treaties is theoretically ambiguous. On the one hand many authors (Congleton 
1992; Olson, 1993; McGuire and Olson, 1996; Niskanen, 1997; Lake and Baum, 2001; Bueno 
de Mesquita et al, 2003) have argued that non-democratic regimes are likely to under-provide   6 
public goods, including environmental quality. The logic is as follows. Non-democratic re-
gimes are typically ruled by small elites that use the resources of their respective country to 
create personal wealth and to redistribute income from their populations towards themselves. 
If the costs of stricter environmental policies enacted by international environmental 
treaty(ies) are born disproportionately by the elites (as it would for example be the case with 
restrictions on polluting industrial activities) while the benefits are uniformly dispersed 
throughout the population, then these elites would have little incentive to ratify such treaties. 
In contrast, in democracies the median voter, who decides on public policy, faces a lower cost 
from environmental policies relative to the economic and political elite. This makes the ratifi-
cation of environmental treaties more likely in democratic regimes.   
Congelton (1992) also argues that a shorter time horizon of the policy maker leads to 
less stringent environmental regulations because many forms of environmental degradation 
develop slowly and over long periods of time (e.g. climate change, biodiversity, air and water 
pollution). Given that authoritarian rules tend to have a shorter time horizon
2, Congleton con-
cludes that democracies enact stricter environmental regulations than non-democracies. Quite 
the reverse, one can argue that elected governments may have shorter planning horizons than 
non-elected governments because of political myopia. Since the social costs of current eco-
nomic behavior and political choices often materialize over the long term and burden future 
generations and future politicians, democratic leaders may refrain from ratifying international 
environmental treaties more often that their autocratic counterparts who do not face frequent 
(re-) election and can take more costly decisions (stricter environmental policies) with longer 
term benefits without fear of been punished by myopic voters.  Consequently, democracies 
might be less willing to ratify international treaties. 
 
                                                 
2 Bueno de Merquita et al (2003) empirically show that autocrats survive in office more than 
democrats (p.581)   7 
H2(a): The higher the level of democracy, the higher (lower) the probability that a 




Grossman and Kruger (1995) argue that the relationship between income levels and environ-
mental quality (air pollution) is not an automatic one but rather it seems to exist through an 
induced policy-response. That is, governments take into account citizens demands for better 
environmental quality and in return implement stricter regulations that improve the environ-
ment. Payne (1995), subsequently, examines the mechanisms that induce policy-response and 
argues that democratic political systems unlike authoritarian ones provide civil liberties such 
as freedom of speech, press and association, which ensure political accountability and conse-
quently secure a stronger emergence of public voice
3 and a higher degree of government re-
sponse to environmental interests of the citizens.
4  High levels of civil liberties imply that the 
citizens, by being well informed by independent mass media about government policies and 
by being able to express freely their opinions and organize alternative political views, are bet-
ter able to impose “high audience costs” on their leaders for defecting on their promises 
(Slantchev, 2006). As Fearon (1994) and Martin (2000) argue once democratic leaders have 
committed themselves to a particular policy are less likely to renege because the “domestic 
audience costs” of defection are very high. That is, with re-election weighing heavily on their 
minds, they will sign only the international environmental treaties that they can ratify. Con-
versely, in non-democratic systems, where civil liberties are suppressed and the “domestic 
audience costs” are low, leaders often choose to break their promises since defection is cost-
                                                 
3 Environmental movements have gained influence mainly by means of freedom speech, press 
and association. 
4 Neumayer (2002b) tests the arguments posited by Payne and finds that democracies because 
of their high levels of civil liberties show stronger environmental commitments than non-
democracies.   8 
less.  Moreover, the high levels of transparency that characterized democratic political sys-
tems further induce leaders to make only credible commitments (Gaubatz, 1996).   
 
H2(b): The higher the level of civil liberties, the higher the probability that a country 




Diffusion processes have recently attracted considerable attention
5. Policy diffusion is usually 
defined as a process in which a choice made by one decision-maker influences the choices 
made by others, and is in turn influenced by them. So far the diffusion literature has concen-
trated mainly on the mechanisms by which policy diffusion occurs and points to diverse 
mechanisms ranging from Bayesian learning to rational competition to common norms, emu-
lation and coercion. Most studies take several of these mechanisms into account and assume 
that each mechanism suffices to increase the probability of policy diffusion, and that the ef-
fect of each mechanism adds to that of the others. For example, Elkins et al (2006) find that 
coercion and competition play a role in the diffusion of Bilateral Trade Agreements; Simmons 
and Elkins (2004) find that both competition and learning matter for economic liberalization; 
Henisz et al pose that coercion, common norms and competition significantly contribute to 
diffusion of market-oriented reforms; and Meyer et al (1997) find that both developing and 
developed countries sign human rights treaties to show their commitment to global norms.  
Although all the above mentioned diffusion mechanisms may play a role in inducing 
states to ratify international environmental treaties, we believe that most of them are highly 
correlated and thus captured by other factors that we deem to be important in this paper. For 
example, the competition and coercion mechanisms are closely related to our trade partners 
argument, and the emulation and common norms to membership in international environ-
                                                 
5 Elkins, Guzman and Simmons 2006; Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett 2006; Meseguer  2005, 
2006; Levi-Faur 2005; Elkins and Simmons 2005; Henisz, Zelner and Guillen  2005; Sim-
mons and Elkins 2004.   9 
mental NGOs and region. Consequently, we argue that the most relevant to our analysis diffu-
sion mechanism is learning. Learning is defined as the acquisition of new relevant informa-
tion that permits the updating of beliefs about the effects of a new policy (Simmons and El-
kins, 2004; Meseguer 2006). For example, Meseguer (2006) shows that states are more in-
clined to enact economic reforms such as privatization and liberalization of trade if they have 
observed that these policies have been successful in other countries. Moreover, as Schelling 
(1978) notes most governments are highly sensitive to the number of other countries that have 
adopted a particular policy. As such, we might observe a “threshold” effect, that is if a certain 
number of countries has already ratified a certain treaty, other countries might be short of jus-
tification why they themselves are not ratifying it. Hence 
 
H3(a): The higher the number of countries that has already ratified a certain treaty, the 
higher the probability that other countries also ratify the treaty. 
 
In addition, cautious political leaders might wait for other countries to ratify a certain treaty 
and await respective consequences until they dare ratifying themselves. We therefore expect 
“older” treaties to be more prone to ratification: 
 
H3(b): The longer a treaty has been open for ratification, the higher the probability 




The large body of theoretical and empirical literature that focuses on economic determinants 
of environmental quality has led to the identification of an important empirical pattern, the so-
called the environmental Kuznets curve (Selden and Song, 1994; Grossman and Kruger, 
1995). That is, pollution first deteriorates and then improves as income per capita increases. 
The standard interpretation of this finding is that environmental quality is a luxury good in the   10 
initial stages of economic development. Poor countries facing a trade-off between protecting 
the environment and improving material living standards opt for the latter. Once significant 
gains have been made in living standards, the opportunity cost of stricter environmental poli-
cies becomes (relatively) smaller and voters are prepared to accept lower economic or per-
sonal income growth (the two may not be identical) in order to enjoy less pollution (the envi-
ronment becomes a normal good). Therefore, our prediction is that a nation’s willingness to 
participate in international environmental treaties will be positive correlated with its national 
per capital income. 
 
H4:  The higher a country’s gdp per capita, the higher the probability that this coun-
try ratifies an environmental treaty. 
 
Environmental quality 
Nations’ willingness to participate in international environmental treaties may also reflect the 
degree to which environmental degradation impinges upon national welfare. Sprinz and Vaah-
toranta (1994), for example, argue that “the worse the state of the environment, the greater the 
incentives to reduce the ecological vulnerability of the state”. Conversely, nations experienc-
ing high levels of domestic environmental regulation will demonstrate greater willingness to 
take on international environmental commitments since the costs of compliance will be on 
average lower for those countries. Unfortunately it is quite difficult to obtain environmental 
regulation data for different countries and for a long time period. Thus we use SO2 emissions 
as proxy for the stringency of domestic environmental regulation. Lower levels of SO2 emis-
sions should imply stricter environmental laws.  
 
H5:   The higher a country’s level of domestic environmental regulation, the higher 
the probability that this country ratifies an environmental treaty. 
 
   11 
Finally, we include in our analysis several factors that have been found in the literature to 
affect the willingness of a country to participate in international environmental commitments.  
Trade partners: High levels of trade make states economically interdependent. This implies 
that countries may ratify an environmental treaty not only in order to reap the benefits of in-
creasing trade relations but also countries could use trade relations to coerce their trade part-
ners-by threatening to disrupt trade flows- to ratify an international environmental agreement. 
Beron et al (2003), however, show that power relations based on trade interdependence play 
only a limited role in the willingness of the states to ratify the Montreal Protocol on Sub-
stances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.  
Membership in international environmental NGOs: Meyer et al (1997) argue that international 
environmentalist pressure on a country positively affects its willingness to ratify environ-
mental  treaties.  Roberts  et  al’s  (2004)  analysis  of  22  international  environmental  treaties 
shows that national membership in international environmental NGOs is closely correlated 
with environmental treaty ratification. 
Population: population is a standard control variable in models that examine environmental 
issues.  While  its  impact  on  environmental  quality  is  quite  straightforward,  more  densely 
populated countries have significantly higher energy and production needs and hence are ex-
pected to have higher pollution levels, its impact on MEAs is not so clear. Population per se is 
unrelated to participation in MEAs. Population becomes relevant only and only if it is per-
ceived as a proxy for a state characteristic, that is power
6. Neumayer (2002a,b) argues that 
powerful states are more likely to participate in MEAs “...in order to demonstrate their impor-
tance in world politics, of which the environment represents one part. In other words, impor-
tant countries want to be seen as good citizens and leaders in world environmental affairs.” 
Although we also expect important and powerful states to participate more in MEAs, we ar-
gue that they do so because they are concerned with their own security and well-being and not 
                                                 
6 Power status in the international level is highly correlated with population.   12 
because “they want to be seen as good citizens”. Powerful states are more able and likely to 
employ coercive methods against countries that are perceived to have global environmental 
significance and consequently affect their welfare. For example, now days Brazil faces con-
tinuing pressures from major countries (USA, EU, etc) to protect the Amazon forest.  
Region: variation in regional norms of state respect for the environment should also affect 
participation in international environmental commitments. Simmons and Elkins (2004) argue 
that states are influenced by the choices made by their “peers” defined in terms of common 
language, common religion and region. Thus, where norms of state respect for the environ-
ment are strong, we should expect to find high rates of ratification of international environ-
mental treaties. (Control for EU membership) 
 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
We empirically test our hypotheses on a new panel dataset on 180 countries’ attitude (ratifica-
tion  yes/no)  towards  international  environmental  treaties  from  1950  to  2005.  The  unit  of 
analysis is the treaty-country dyad per year. Each treaty enters our dataset the moment it is 
open for ratification. For each year we then estimate the probability of a particular country 
ratifying a certain treaty as described in section 4.2. This approach allows us to include both 
country and treaty specific characteristics. 
We proceed by first introducing the variables used in our analysis and then discussing the 
statistical method we use. The empirical part concludes with a discussion of some preliminary 
results. 
 
3.1 Variables and Operationalization 
 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable in our study is the ratification of an environmental treaty.   13 
 Data is retrieved from the Environmental Agreement Dataset by CIESIN (Columbia Univer-




In this analysis we measure a country’s trade openness by the ratio of the sum of exports and 
imports to GDP. Source: Gleditsch (2002); Heston (2006) 
We also look at manufacturing trade (surplus vs deficit) – structure of trade 
IGO membership
7 
Membership in IGOs. Pevehouse et al. (2004) 
Democracy: institutional features 
Our measure for the political system variable is an index capturing the extent of democratic 
participation in government, Polity, from the POLITY IV data set. It is a composite index that 
includes the following elements: presence of competitive political participation, guarantee of 
openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and existence of institutionalized 
constraints on the exercise of executive power. Polity ranges from –10 (mostly autocratic) to 
10  (mostly democratic) (See Marshall and Jaggers (2002). With a view to the abovemen-
tioned theoretical arguments we expect the sign of the relationship between democratic politi-
cal systems and environmental quality to be ambiguous. 
Democracy: civil liberties 
We use the civil liberties (civil) component of the Freedom House index. The Freedom House 
organization rates all countries of the world on dimensions of political
8 and civil rights. The 
civil liberties part of the index measures constraints among other things on: association and 
                                                 
7 We plan to conduct a network analysis that assess a country’s centrality in the international 
system (cf. Ward 2006), in this preliminary version we limit ourselves to assessing the num-
ber of IGOs a country is a member to. 
8 The political rights dimension, which is very close to the POLITY IV measure of democ-
racy, captures mainly the fairness and freedom of elections, that is, whether a government 
came to power by election or by gun; whether elections, if any, are free and fair; and whether 
an opposition exists and has the opportunity to take power with the consent of the electorate.   14 
organizational rights (freedom of assembly, demonstration, political or quasi-political organi-
zations including ad hoc issue groups, and free trade unions and farmers organizations); the 
rule of law and human rights (existence of an independent judiciary, and freedom from ex-
treme government indifference and corruption); and personal autonomy and economic rights 
(secured property rights, personal social freedoms, and equality of opportunity including free-
dom from exploitation by or dependency on employers, union leaders or bureaucrats). Free-
dom House rates countries on a 1 to 7 scale.  In countries with a rating of 1, law is unshaken 
and there is freedom of expression, assembly, and association. Increasing numbers indicate 
that laws and traditions impinge increasingly on such freedoms until, in states ranked as 7, 
citizens have no rights vis-à-vis the state and “…an overwhelming and justified fear of repres-
sion characterizes these societies” (Freedom in the World 1999-2000).  Instead of working 
with the original variable, we have chosen to transform it so that a higher value of the new 
variable means a higher level of civil liberties (hence, 7 now represents the highest level of 
civil liberties). This is an innocuous change that does not affect anything and is done for rea-
sons of consistency with the other variables (where higher means more) and in order to elimi-
nate a possible source of confusion in the reading of the tables.  
 
Diffusion:  to test the diffusion argument and in particular H3(a), a variable measuring the 
number of states that have ratified the particular treaty is included in the analysis. As this 
number of states increases, the probability that the state ratifies a treaty also increases.  
Similarly, the older a treaty is, the higher the probability of its ratification. 
Economy 
In this analysis we measure a country’s wealth by Log(GDP/capita). Gleditsch (2002) 
Domestic environmental policy 
SO2 emissions Stern: http://www.rpi.edu/~sternd/datasite.html 
Trading partners   15 
NGOs membership 
Population 
Region: EU membership 
 
3.2 Statistical Method 
Our unit of analysis are country-treaty dyads over time. That is, for each year that a specific 
treaty is open to ratification, it is paired with all possible member countries, so that each ob-
servation is determined by a particular treaty, the country that may or may not have ratified it, 
and the year this action did or did not take place. Since we are dealing with a binary outcome 
variable (ratification yes, no) several panel logit models appear appropriate. In this prelimi-
nary analysis we rely on the binary-time-series-cross-sectional (BTSCS) approach described 
in Beck et al. (1998). 
 
3.3 Results 
Table 1 shows the result of a logit model using regression splines to account for temporal de-
pendency of observations (for a detailed discussion, the reader is referred to Beck 1998). 
 
Table 1: Estimation results BTSCS-logit 
 
  ratification 
democracy, polity  -0.009  -0.007 
  (12.32)**  (7.99)** 
log openness  -0.355  -0.354 
  (53.45)**  (53.12)** 
polopen    -9,409.111 
    (3.72)** 
log gdp/ capita  0.612  0.558 
  (8.62)**  (7.71)** 
log gdp/ capita squared  -0.019  -0.016 
  (4.51)**  (3.67)** 
So2  0.000  0.000 
  (9.99)**  (9.29)** 
number of IGO-memberships  0.052  0.053 
  (153.19)**  (150.50)** 
number of countries that have ratified  0.047  0.047 
  (249.18)**  (249.10)** 
age of treaty  0.076  0.077   16 
  (194.47)**  (193.87)** 
log population density  -0.069  -0.070 
  (14.07)**  (14.19)** 
cubic spline1  0.010  0.010 
  (181.42)**  (181.44)** 
cubic spline2  -0.004  -0.004 
  (179.78)**  (179.80)** 
constant  -14.371  -14.132 
  (47.53)**  (45.78)** 
 
observations  1147121  1147121 
Prob > chi2  0.0000  0.0000 
Pseudo R2  0.6867  0.6886 
Note:  absolute value of z statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
The results presented in Table 1 show that contrary to our theoretical expectation, democracy 
appears to have a negative effect on the probability that a country ratifies a certain treaty 
(H2). Although statistically significant, the negative effect of democracy is not very substan-
tial. As such, holding all other variables at their mean, an increase in the polity scale from -10 
(autocracy) to 10 (fully established democracy) only decreases the probability of a country 
ratifying a certain treaty by .0000241, which is virtually equal to zero. It should further be 
noted that we have used a rather crude measure of democracy (polity2 score) and ignore spe-
cific effects of democracy (differentiation of institutional vs. behavioural aspects, specific 
features, such as presidentialism, federalism). A more in-depth analysis of the effects of de-
mocracy on a country’s propensity to ratify a certain treaty is postponed to future research. 
Further, the direction of the trade openness coefficient enters with the expected sign and is 
statistically significant (H1(a)) and supports the “race to the bottom” argument (cf. Revesz, 
1992; Drezner 2001). 
As expected, the number of IGOs a country is a participating in (H1(b)), the number of 
other countries that have already ratified the treaty (H4(a)), and the “age” of a treaty (H4(b)), 
the period of time a treaty has been open for ratification) have a positive effect on the prob-
ability of ratifying a treaty. This is a first indication, that diffusion might indeed take place 
with respect to the ratification of environmental treaties.   17 
To get a better intuition of the estimated relationship between our independent vari-
ables and the probability of a country ratifying a certain treaty, we simulated predicted prob-
abilities
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Figure 1:  predicted effect of democracy on the probability  
of treaty ratification holding all other variables at  
their mean 
 
Interestingly, the effect of democracy appears to be so small that in figure 1 the relationship 
appears to be positive. This might be due to the variance introduced by the simulation routine 
(note the scale of the Y-variable, the change in the probability of ratifying a treaty given dif-
ferent levels of democracy is hardly sizeable). 
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Figure 1:  predicted effect of the number of countries that 
have already ratified a treaty on the probability  
of treaty ratification holding all other variables 
at their mean 
 
The effect of the number of countries that have already ratified a treaty is depicted in 
figure 2. Again, this figure appears a little misleading at first sight. Whereas the rather small 
confidence interval reflects the high z-values, the relationship between the number of coun-
tries that have already ratified a treaty and the probability of further ratifications is counter-
intuitive. Again, we need more refined analysis to interpret such results with more confidence. 
We can further see that the joint effect of democracy and trade openness which we in-
cluded in our model (last column in table 1) to find out whether democracies deal differently 
with the effects of globalization than other types of political regimes, has a substantial and 
statistically significant negative effect on the probability of treaty ratification. The negative 
influence of the joint effect of trade openness and democracy is in line with the individual 
effects of both variables. 
Coming back to the hypotheses outlined in section 2, we can conclude that the empiri-
cal evidence gathered so far supports our country-specific and treaty specific hypotheses (dif-
fusion effects).   19 
The fact that most variables appear to have a rather small effect on the probability of 
treaty ratification might partly be due to the fact that in the current set-up (yearly treaty-
country dyads), ratification is a rather rare event (see section 3.2). We will thus refine our 




The aim of this paper was to shed light on the relationship between globalization, political 
institutions (notably, democracy) and international environmental policy. 
Whereas due to data limitation and some methodological shortcomings, results remain indica-
tive, our preliminary analysis supports the arguments we advanced.   20 
Appendix: Independent variables  
 










Marshall & Jaggers (2002) 
Freedom House 
Trade openness  Sum  of  exports  and  im-
ports divided by GDP 
Gleditsch (2002); Heston (2006) 
IGO membership  Membership in IGOs  Pevehouse et al. (2004) 
GDP/capita  Log(GDP/capita)  Gleditsch (2002) 
Domestic  envi-
ronmental policy 
SO2 emissions  Stern: 
http://www.rpi.edu/~sternd/datasite.html 
Population  Population density  Gleditsch (2002) 
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